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No tenet of American political ideology is clung to more tenaciously
than is the idea that private and public sectors of our economy are, and
should forever be, strictly separated. It is widely acknowledged, of
course, that political choices shape markets; but so long as these interven-
tions do not discriminate among particular outcomes or players, they do
not violate the integrity of either domain. The "free market," in this
view, occupies one sphere of social activity; "politics," another. Govern-
ment occasionally intervenes in the market to favor particular groups,
but these boundary crossings are exceptions to the general rule of neu-
trality. They should be carefully controlled and monitored, lest the bor-
derline become blurred. This concern with the integrity of public-
private borders is not the exclusive province of those on the right of the
political spectrum, who forever fret about involuntary redistributions of
wealth. Many who style themselves liberals and leftists also seek a strict
demarcation. Their spectre is an alliance of large corporations and gov-
ernment agencies that would conspire against the rest of us.
I do not want to suggest that these concerns are unimportant, or with-
out bases in history. Our collective experience during the post-war era
confirms, to an extent, warnings from both the theorists of "democratic
overload"' and the prophets of a "military-industrial state."' 2 And I
sleep better at night knowing that the likes of Milton Friedman and
Charles Reich are on the barricades, forever vigilant. Separating what
is "public" from what is "private," what is appropriately the responsibil-
ity of "government" from what we wish to assign to the "market," more-
over, can be a useful exercise to the extent that it forces us to examine
how our social life is now organized, and how it could be organized
differently. It also can help reveal deeper understandings and assump-
tions about the relationship between our "deontological" selves and our
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social context. 3 But a preoccupation with the sanctity of private-public
borders can be distracting as well. It can distract us from examining the
subtle ways in which such borders are inevitably permeable, and the
important choices available to us in dealing with the resulting
interpenetration.
This is not the occasion for a prolonged exegesis on the ideology of
public-private boundaries, nor for a detailed discussion of how the re-
cent debate over United States industrial policy has served to illuminate
(or obscure) these boundary disputes. But Charles Reich's thoughtful
response to some of my recent writing prompts me to fire off a few flares
which, I hope, will shed a bit of light on this dark and contested terrain.
I. The Problem of Legitimacy
Charles Reich seems to have two basic worries about what he per-
ceives to be my inordinate disrespect for public-private boundaries. The
first has to do with government legitimacy. He frets that "[i]ndustrial
policy would put government in the position of giving substantial bene-
fits to some companies but not to others. . . . Inevitably government
would thereby lose some of the neutrality needed to govern."
4
But Charles Reich confuses prescriptions with descriptions. Govern-
ment already provides substantial benefits to some companies but not to
others. Consider, for example, the sharp disparities in the effective rate
of corporate income tax paid by various industries in 1981 (see Exhibit
1). 5 The industries with the lowest effective tax rate, interestingly, are
either service industries largely sheltered from international competition
(such as retailing, finance, airlines, utilities, commercial banks, and rail-
roads), or natural-resource industries (oil and oil refining, petrochemi-
cals, crude oil, and paper and wood products). Aerospace and metal
manufacturing also fare relatively well. On the other hand, manufac-
turers of automobiles, trucks, pharmaceuticals, appliances, and electron-
ics bear a relatively high effective tax.
Consider another set of disparities-the percentage of industrial re-
search and development funded by the federal government (see Exhibit
2). (This sample is from 1977, the most recent year for which data are
available.) Here the allocation of winners and losers is somewhat differ-
ent. Aerospace again is among the winners, and automobiles
3. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1983).
4. C. Reich, Conj'cts Ahead on "The Next American Frontier", 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 191,
196 (1984).
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are adapted from R. Reich, An Industrial Poh/y of the Right, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1983,
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Exhibit I.
Efectt've Rates of Corporate Income Tax
Automobiles 48% Airlines 16%
Trucking 46% Metal manufacturing 10%
Pharmaceuticals 36% Utilities 9%
Electronics, appliances 29% Aerospace 7%
Food processing 27% Petrochemicals 5%
Industrial & farm equipment 24% Crude oil 3%
Retailing 23% Commercial banks 2%
Oil and refining 19% Railroads (8)%
Diversified financial 17% Paper and wood (14)%
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Taxation of Banks and Thri? Institutions, March 9, 1983,
Table 2. (There are a number of ways to compute effective tax rates, and some computations
generate results slightly different from these; but, regardless of methodology, great disparities
exist.)
Exhibit II.
Percentage of R&Dfunded by the Federal Government
Aircraft and parts 70% Motor vehicles 8%
Transportation equipment 55% Nonelectrical machinery 7%
(excludes autos)
Fabricated metals 53% Petrochemicals 2%
Communications equipment, 49% Primary metals 2%
electronic components
Electrical equipment 26% Drugs and medicines <1%
(excludes communications)
Scientific instruments 22% Textiles and apparel <1%




and pharmaceuticals among the losers. But the petrochemical industry
now becomes something of a loser, while electrical equipment moves
into the winner's camp. Nor does the distribution of research and devel-
opment subsidies reveal the same bias against internationally-traded
manufacturing industries as does the effective tax rate.
This inventory could go on, including virtually every area of govern-
ment activity. In the cases of the federally-subsidized loans (amounting
to some $56 billion in new loans to specific industries in 1982) and loan
guarantees ($36 billion), the biggest winners by far are housing con-
struction and agriculture, with aerospace and aircraft equipment com-
ing in a distant third. On the other hand, the major industrial
beneficiaries of import restrictions are steel, textiles, apparel, and
automobiles (together comprising approximately one-fourth of all U.S.
merchandise imports). And the Federal government obligingly
purchases most of the output of the firms that produce aircraft, commu-
nications equipment, super computers and lasers.
Not surprisingly, the overall pattern of "winners" and "losers" con-
forms to no obvious criteria of public welfare. For example, the U.S.
automobile industry (on which one out of every six American workers
directly or indirectly depended for a livelihood in 1980) owes its present
condition, at least in part, to a mixture of generous import restrictions
and loan guarantees, onerous environmental regulations, relatively high
effective tax rates, and little or no government-supported research. On
the other hand, the housing-construction industry has been the indirect
beneficiary of large credit and tax subsidies to American homeowners,
the cumulative effect of which has been to help channel approximately
one-third of U.S. gross domestic fixed investment over the last dozen
years into housing and to transform the housing stock into a form of
savings for countless middle-class families. The Federal government
spends almost five times more money on research and development for
commercial fisheries than it does for steel. As of 1980, the government
was providing $455 million annually in tax breaks for timber and none
for semiconductors. And the fact that substantial benefits go to indus-
tries sheltered from international competition notwithstanding, some of
the chief recipients of government largesse-like aircraft, communica-
tions equipment, electronic components, wheat and soybeans-are
among the nation's most successful exporters.
Charles Reich concedes that government already engages in some al-
location, and that industrial policy would give coherence to actions that
are now incoherent. "But," he warns, "purposeful discrimination may
more readily lead to challenge than do those policies that are merely
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chaotic.'"6
Are the discriminations I have described "merely chaotic"? Are they
unintentional? They certainly look that way. They appear to be nothing
but the fallout from separate government programs designed to achieve
all manner of things-ensure national security, provide Americans with
decent housing, protect domestic energy supplies, and so on. The pro-
grams were not officially intended to advance or retard the development
of specific industries and companies. No one picked the winners and
losers. They seem to have been anointed inadvertently.
But closer inspection reveals a not-so-well-kept secret. What looks like
inadvertence is actually the product of careful strategy on the part of
many companies, trade associations and their lobbyists and lawyers, and
not a few sophisticated members of Congress and the Executive branch.
True, the official language appearing in the Congressional Record and in
administrative rulings-justifying this or that tax credit, loan guarantee,
or research subsidy-typically makes at least passing reference to the
public interest. It would be unseemly not to. And all but the most con-
firmed cynics would concede that many of these programs do benefit
broad segments of the public. After all, we do want an effective national
defense and affordable housing. But the fact is that these public benefits
are often incidental to the choice of what industry or company actually
comes out the winner. Those who promote and shape public policy in
America usually know fairly well how a given policy will affect the de-
velopment of a specific industry or company. Indeed, such a purpose
often lies at the very heart of the initiative, encased within layers of
public justifications bearing no direct relation to it. And more often
than not, the most heated legislative and administrative battles concern
not the wisdom of the policy itself but the underlying heart of the mat-
ter-which industry or company will win and which will lose by it.
Winners and losers are picked all the time; the picking is the stuff of
politics.
Perhaps Charles Reich would prefer that government refrain from all
policies which discriminate among companies and industries, even those
whose purposeful discriminations are hidden from public view. The
problem with this approach, put simply, is that it would render the gov-
ernment incapable of doing much of anything. Laws and agency rul-
ings need not specifically target winners and losers in order for their
effects to be highly discriminatory. Because each industry and company
has a distinct competitive position relative to all others-based on the
mix of costs it bears and the markets it serves-any seemingly even-




handed program is likely to affect it differently from others. Even some-
thing so apparently neutral as a tax credit for new capital investment
favors industries and companies whose competitive success hinges on
continually updating plant and equipment, relative to those that de-
pend on the careful hiring and training of personnel or on the use of
sophisticated marketing techniques. (Thus, the disparities noted above
in effective rates of corporate income tax are due not so much to tax
breaks targeted to particular industries as to differences in the ability of
industries to take advantage of superficially neutral deductions and
credits.) Most industry lobbyists, and not a few legislators and govern-
ment officials, well understand this principle: no tax, credit, or subsidy pro-
gram, however neutral in appearance, is neutral in competiti've effect.
There is no way out. Even if we were to follow the pontifications of
Milton Friedman and the rhetoric (but not the deeds) of Ronald Rea-
gan, and to reduce the size of government, we would still be faced with
all sorts of purposeful discriminations. They crop up even when decid-
ing upon minimal "rules of the game"-for example, should copyright
protection be extended to cover the circuitry etched on computer chips?
Should coal slurry pipelines have "eminent domain" authority to run
beneath. railroad lines? Should a Japanese manufacturer of fiber-optic
cable be allowed to sell its wares in the United States at a fraction of the
cost of producing them in Japan?
But perhaps Charles Reich's real concern is that any concerted effort
to render more coherent our industrial policy would be doomed by the
same special interests that have fashioned it in the first place. That is,
any explicit recognition of the winners and losers inevitably associated
with a particular policy, and any move toward a more comprehensive
and centralized administration of such policies, would encourage more
special pleadings and politicize the economy to an even greater extent-
ultimately threatening the legitimacy of all governing institutions. This
is a valid concern. But it seems to me that a stronger argument can be
made for just the opposite hypothesis: that the only way to transform our
present industrial policy from a "do-it-yourself" variety dominated by
the most powerful companies and industries is by centralizing its admin-
istration and enhancing its visibility. Choices would still have to be
made, of course, but at least they could then be informed by public
debate. Indeed, it seems to me that such an open industrial policy
would have a better chance of gaining broad public support than our
presently covert one, precisely because the public would be more di-
rectly involved in creating it. The experience of other democratic indus-
trialized nations, and our own history, provide some evidence for both
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points of view, although I believe somewhat more evidence for the
latter.
II. Preservation of Ltberty
Charles Reich's second worry is that any further blurring of the dis-
tinction between the government and private corporations will threaten
individual liberties. "[W]orkers' disability benefits and other govern-
ment entitlements, their social lives, and even their political influence,
will come under the expanded jurisdiction of corporate employers." '7 As
a result, workers would be more dependent on their companies, less free
to change jobs or otherwise buck the "system."
Here again, Charles Reich expresses a valid concern, but it can only
be understood and addressed once we distinguish between description
and prescription. The underlying problem derives not from public-pri-
vate border crossings, but from a political failure to acknowledge inter-
penetration and to structure it in such a way as to protect personal
freedom.
To an increasing extent over the last fifteen years, social benefits to
individuals have been channelled through the private sector. Govern-
ment agencies now contract with private for-profit corporations to sup-
ply welfare services like transportation for the handicapped, day care
and nursing homes (80 percent of which are now operated for profit,
although the government pays two-thirds of their costs).8 Help also is
provided indirectly through tax credits, vouchers (such as food stamps)
and cash grants, whose recipients purchase goods and services directly
from the private sector.
Perhaps the most dramatic growth has occurred in social services that
are passed through the corporation to their employees, tax free. These
include such benefits as health insurance, life insurance, retirement sav-
ings, child care, and personal counseling for marital, alcohol, drug, emo-
tional, family, legal, and financial problems. Because employees do not
pay taxes on these benefits, the government in effect pays a portion of
their costs. In fiscal 1985, for example, the government will forego $80.7
billion in revenues because employers' contributions to workers' pension
accounts are not counted as income to the workers. The income earned
by pension accounts also is exempt from taxation. In addition, the gov-
ernment will forego $28.2 billion in revenues because employees need
not count as income employer contributions to health insurance plans
7. Id. at 198.




and direct reimbursement for medical care costs. All told, "tax expendi-
tures" in the form of social benefits to employees will total $116 billion.9
To get some idea of the pervasiveness of social services channelled
through the private sector one has only to look closely at the way our
society has organized institutional care. For example, it has been esti-
mated that in the State of California, on any particular day, about 8
million people of the state's 19.5 million residents are under the care of
some institution-in day care centers, schools, hospitals, prisons, old-age
homes, and the like.' 0 This figure does not include the 2 million people
enrolled in colleges and vocational and technical schools. Only a frac-
tion of these institutions are directly financed and run by government-
state or federal. Some institutions are financed by government but run
privately. Some are run privately and financed in the first instance by
companies or individuals, but government support nevertheless is criti-
cal: the institution may be deemed not-for-profit, in which case it does
not pay taxes on its net revenues; the company or individual who
purchases the services may be able to deduct the costs from its income;
employees may get the services tax free. Under these different circum-
stances, where does public sphere end and private begin?
This channelling of social services through the private sector surely
creates possibilities for abuse. Private providers may deliver services
that are sub-standard. They may "skim the cream" by serving or insur-
ing only those who have a relatively low risk of becoming particularly
needy. They may discriminate on the basis of sex or race. They may
condition delivery upon a recipient's willingness to conform his or her
behavior to certain corporate standards.
Government is capable of these same abuses when it delivers social
services directly, of course. But at least then, any unlawful discrimina-
tions or unconstitutional standards can readily be challenged in court.
Charles Reich seems to be arguing that indirect social services represent
a greater danger to individual liberties because they would be much
more difficult to monitor and control. Precisely because they would be
more pervasive, they would be more insidious. How could the courts
effectively police the wide variety of forms which these services might
take? When a person's livelihood is at stake, how could coercion be
distinguished from acquiescence? And therefore how could we be cer-
tain that people would stand up for their rights?
I'm merely suggesting one line of argument. Charles Reich barely
9. Clark, On the Fringe-1985 Could Be the Year Congress Zeroes in on Employee Benefits, 16
NAT'L J. 1356, 1357 (1984).
10. Bell, The Public Household-On "Fiscal Sociology" and the Liberal Society, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, Fall 1974, at 29, 39.
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hints at it. But the curious thing about this argument, quite apart from
its failure to comprehend the extent of the public-private mix, is that it
leaves out the "market" altogether. That is, the argument assumes that
social services channelled through the private sector are just like social
services delivered directly by the government, except that they take a
slightly different route. This assumption is based on the obvious fact
that companies extend such in-kind benefits to their employees because
the government in effect pays part of their costs; if the benefits were not
exempt from income taxes, employees presumably would prefer the
cash. But the argument ignores the public justification for relying on the
private sector: the belief that competition among providers-and the
potent fear that unsatisfied beneficiaries will take their business else-
where-will enhance quality and reduce costs. Theoretically, at least,
there would be far less need for judicial intervention to protect benefi-
ciaries under this sort of market-based system, simply because the bene-
ficiaries would have more control over the providers.
But in order to make a system like this work as it should to enhance
quality, reduce costs, and to protect individual liberties, government
would need to structure carefully the terms of competition. For example,
duly-elected employee representatives might be given initial responsibil-
ity for screening potential providers and negotiating alternative pack-
ages of benefits. Government might require that services be portable, so
that employees can in effect carry them from job to job without losing
accumulated benefits. Providers might be required to extend benefits to
workers who are unemployed, in return for government-supplied vouch-
ers. There would need to be rules against "cream skimming" and other
forms of discrimination.
However the system is designed, it should be clear that the practical
choice is not between public and private provision of services. It is be-
tween a rather ad-hoc "public-private" system whose growth has been
stimulated largely by tax considerations, and which is open to a variety
of abuses, and a public-private system specifically designed to foster
competition and to protect individual liberties. The underlying lesson
here is analogous to the previous one, drawn in connection with govern-
ment advantages flowing to certain companies and industries. Some of
the most important choices we face concern not whether government
benefits are to be allocated, but how they are to be allocated. The
boundaries already have been crossed; in some respects they never ex-
isted to begin with. And in order to begin making public choices about
such allocations we need to enhance the visibility of this system of bene-
fits, give it a greater degree of administrative integrity and coherence,




III. The Challenge to Pohtzcs
Government legitimacy and personal liberty are two of the values
that Charles Reich would place particularly high on his list of criteria
for a society evincing "balance, harmony and health." I would agree.
But he is somewhat less concerned than I am about economic growth
and industrial evolution. Or rather, he worries that these more materi-
alistic values may undermine the former, and that therefore we need
some safeguards-like "social impact statements"-to remind us of
these "other priorities." I am not sure what Charles Reich means by a
"social impact statement," but if the Environmental Impact Statement
is any guide its real meaning is apt to be found within lawsuits mounted
by those who would seek to delay or block government action. Still, I
am in favor of efforts designed to force policy-makers to think more
broadly about the consequences of their decisions. Policies aimed re-
lentlessly at promoting economic development to the exclusion of other
social values would hardly improve our collective well-being.
Economic growth is not necessarily inconsistent with these other val-
ues. To the contrary, as I have argued elsewhere,I l continued economic
growth may be a necessary prerequisite to a more equitable distribution
of wealth and income, more job security, and a greater degree of demo-
cratic participation in economic life. This is because it is probably eas-
ier to summon the political will for creating a more equitable and
democratic society if those who already have a fairly comfortable exist-
ence-in particular, people comprising America's vast middle class-do
not fear that their own standard of living will be eroded in the process.
(One could, of course, conjure up historic examples of economic hard-
ship so extreme that the middle classes join with the poor in expropriat-
ing the wealth of the rich, but this method for gaining a more equitable
distribution of wealth seems somewhat unlikely in modern America.)
These same aspects of what we understand to be "social justice" are
coming to be prerequisites to continued economic growth. This is be-
cause groups who feel particularly burdened by economic change can
mobilize politically to block or forestall change; their claims typically
take the form of quotas, tariffs, restrictions on capital mobility, or subsi-
dies to older companies and industries. It is also because the very organ-
ization of production is coming to depend on groups of citizens who are
collectively committed to enhancing productivity and wealth.'
2
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213,
Yale Law & Policy Review
In short, I believe that social justice and economic growth are bound
up together. And for this reason it seems to me to be vitally important
that we better understand the relationships between our economic poli-
cies and our social life. A more explicit industrial policy represents a
first step. It might enable us to perceive the trade-offs lurking here-
between, say, a particular pattern of economic growth and personal au-
tonomy. It would allow us to ask "what kind of economic growth?" It
would help us decide upon the pace and direction of economic growth.
None of this is intended to suggest that we should politicize every major
economic decision. The point is that most major economic decisions are
by nature political, but the political dimension is often systematically
obscured. This submergence of politics results in economic policies
whose burdens and benefits are allocated in ways that may be felt to be
unfair, or which may jeopardize fundamental freedoms.
The real difference between Charles Reich and me, I think, lies in
Chares Reich's assumption that we don't already have an industrial pol-
icy. He thinks the borders are now relatively secure. He worries that I
am anxious to overrun them with new and far more extensive forms of
government largesse, and that I secretly trust large corporations to take
on the job of transforming the economy with government's help. But he
is wrong on all counts. Our nation's industrial policy is complex and
pervasive. It is dominated by large corporations, but many other organ-
ized groups are also participating in it. It is altering our social and eco-
nomic life in countless ways. It has profound implications for
government legitimacy, personal liberty, economic growth, and other
values. To ignore it, or to pretend that it is of little consequence, is to
give up on the possibility for democratic deliberation and control.
Charles Reich's observation almost twenty years ago, with regard to
the mythology of formal legal processes, has even greater force today
with regard to the mythology of neutral public policies:
It [is a myth which] prevents us from seeing resource allocation as a process
by which some are punished and others rewarded for reasons which have
no relation to objective merits but have relation only to government pol-
icy. It preserves the appearance of the rule of law, making it seem that the
immensely important allocation and planning process is being carried out
at all times subject to fair and equitable guiding principles. 13
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